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Causes of the 1980s Slump in Europe 
UNEMPLOYMENT in Europe has reached levels in this decade that have 
not been seen since the Great Depression. The annual unemployment 
rate in the European Economic Community rose sharply in 1981 and 
continued rising to its 1984-85 plateau. In contrast, the U.S. unemploy- 
ment rate, which also rose to a postwar record level, nearly regained its 
1980 level by 1985, as shown below. 1 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
European Economic 
Community 5.8 7.7 9.3 10.4 10.9 11.2 
United States 7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6 7.5 7.2 
Table 1 details the unemployment record of six European countries from 
1977 through 1985. 
This huge rise of unemployment in Europe has had grave conse- 
quences, of course, not only for jobless individuals, but quite visibly for 
the quality of urban life in much of the north. It is therefore important 
that its causes and potential cures be understood. Yet the slump presents 
difficult problems for economic analysis. 
We are grateful to various members of the Brookings Panel for useful advice on the 
presentation of our ideas. 
1. The European Economic Community unemployment rate is the average of the rates 
in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. Fall 1986 figures give faint signals that a European recovery is, 
or soon will be, under way, as the theory set forth in this paper predicts. 
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Economists have not succeeded in identifying the disturbance or 
disturbances responsible for the contraction of employment with the 
lens of conventional demand-oriented macroeconomic models and ex- 
isting supply-shock models. The profession has proceeded to round up 
the usual suspects, but among these chronic offenders it is not readily 
apparent whodunit or indeed whether any of them dunit. The puzzle is 
forcing another rethinking of macroeconomic theory. 
The persistence of the unemployment also poses a serious challenge 
to the theory of an equilibrium unemployment rate such as that invoked 
in hypotheses of a natural rate of unemployment. For five years in a row, 
European unemployment went from bad to worse, seeming to lack the 
usual gravitational pull back to its "natural" level (if still in its natural 
range) or more generally to any equilibrium level conceived to be 
independent of previous years' real wages. Moreover, though inflation 
fell rather steadily in most European countries, it did not fall fast enough, 
where it fell, to suggest that unemployment greatly exceeded such a 
history-free equilibrium path. 
Several other curious features of the recent experience that a theory 
of the slump in Europe must encompass include the fall of labor's share 
of income, the spurt of productivity, and the vanished excess capacity. 
This report takes up the problem of accounting for the slump, distilling 
a large part of our forthcoming monograph on that subject.2 We go on to 
venture our preliminary thoughts on the further question of what, if 
anything, the countries of Europe could have done to prevent the slump 
or could do now to generate or hasten recovery. 
Table 1. Civilian Unemployment Rates in Europe, 1977-85 
Percent 
Country 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Belgium 7.5 8.1 8.4 9.1 11.1 13.0 14.3 14.5 13.8 
France 4.8 5.2 5.9 6.4 7.7 8.7 8.8 9.9 10.7 
Germany 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.4 4.8 6.9 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Italy 5.4 6.1 6.7 7.2 8.0 9.7 10.9 11.9 12.6 
Netherlands 5.4 5.4 5.5 6.2 8.8 11.8 14.3 14.2 13.2 
United Kingdom 5.3 5.1 4.7 6.0 9.2 10.6 11.6 11.8 12.0 
Sources: Commission of the European Communities, "Annual Economic Review 1985-86," in European Economy, 
no. 26 (Nov. 1985), Statistical Annex, table 3. 
2. Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Edmund Phelps, Explaining the Slump in Europe: Open- 
Economy Theory Reconstructed (Blackwell, forthcoming). 
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The Inadequacy of Conventional Explanations 
A conspicuous candidate to explain the enormous rise of European 
unemployment is Europe's own fiscal policies. By now it is well under- 
stood that the budgetary deficits run in most European countries are in 
most cases induced by the depressed levels of economic activity. At the 
normal level of employment, most of these countries would show a 
budgetary surplus .3 The obvious Keynesian hypothesis blames Europe's 
low employment on its concealed fiscal austerity. 
On the empirical plane it can be countered that this hypothesis may 
be fine in theory, but it is unimportant in practice. The estimates in table 
2 suggest that the inflation-adjusted all-Europe budget surplus did not 
exceed in the mid-1980s its 1980 level and appears in fact to have 
contracted. There is considerable variation in the budgetary experience 
of individual countries. If the intra-European pattern of fiscal stimulus 
matters, we should observe some corresponding variation in unemploy- 
ment experience. In fact, there is remarkable uniformity in the rise in 
unemployment in individual European countries, as table 1 shows. Italy, 
for example, has exhibited little or no increase in its high-employment 
budget surplus, yet during the five-year slump its unemployment rate 
climbed 5.4 points, the average rise in Europe. 
On the theoretical plane the Keynesian hypothesis fails a basic test 
for internal consistency. According to orthodox macroeconomic theory, 
reducing government spending or increasing tax rates, whether in an 
open economy with a freely fluctuating exchange rate or in a hypothetical 
closed economy, lowers nominal interest rates along with total demand 
for domestic output and thus total employment in the process of reducing 
the velocity of money-assuming that the supply of money is not 
permitted to change course in response.4 But, in fact, nominal interest 
rates were not generally depressed in this period. As seen in table 3, 
nominal interest rates everywhere but Denmark were up, not down, in 
1983 and even as late as 1985, compared with 1977. When compared 
with 1979, rates were higher in most countries in 1983 and again in 1985. 
3. Olivier J. Blanchard and Lawrence H. Summers, "Perspectives on High World 
Real Interest Rates," BPEA, 2:1984, pp. 273-324. 
4. In IS-LM terms, the fall of the IS curve produces a downward movement along an 
upward sloping LM curve, so interest and employment fall together. 
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Table 2. Measures of the Structural Budget Surplus in Excess of the 1980 Level as a 
Percentage of the High-Employment Gross Domestic Product, Europe and the United 
States, 1981-85a 
Percentage points 
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Conventionally measured surplus 
France - 1.0 - 1.4 - 1.5 - 0.7 0.1 
Germany 0.1 1.5 2.6 2.6 3.2 
Italy - 3.5 - 3.5 - 1.3 - 1.6 - 2.5 
United Kingdom 2.9 4.4 3.1 2.6 3.1 
Weighted sumb -0.2 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.4 
United States 0.9 - 0.4 - 1.1 - 1.4 - 1.8 
Inflation-adjusted surplus 
France - 1.0 - 1.4 - 1.5 - 0.9 -0.3 
Germany 0.1 1.6 2.5 2.4 2.9 
Italy -5.0 -5.4 -3.2 -5.3 -6.9 
United Kingdom 0.5 0.6 - 1.9 - 2.6 - 1.7 
Weighted sumb - 1.0 -0.6 - 0.5 -0.9 -0.6 
United States 0.4 - 1.4 - 2.2 - 2.4 - 2.9 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Outlook (July 1984), table 8, and (May 
1986), table 25. 
a. A positive sign indicates a move toward restriction (surplus). 
b. Weighted by the average U.S. dollar value of each country's GDP in 1980 prices. 
Table 3. Nominal Money Market Rates, Europe and the United States, 
Selected Years, 1977-85a 
Percent 
Country 1977 1979 1983 1985 
Belgium 5.49 7.97 8.18 8.27 
Denmark 14.48 12.63 12.03 9.97 
France 9.22 9.48 12.63 10.08 
Germany 4.37 6.69 5.78 5.44 
Italy 14.03 11.86 18.44 15.25 
Norway 9.84 8.39 12.27 12.16 
Sweden 9.96 8.19 10.85 13.85 
United Kingdom 8.06 13.59 9.90 11.95 
United States 5.54 11.20 9.09 8.10 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
a. Call money rate for all countries except France (Interbank money rate), Germany (Interbank deposit rate), United 
Kingdom (Treasury Bill rate), and United States (Federal Funds rate). 
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The evidence is all the more crucial when we reflect that, whatever the 
cause, the resulting contraction of employment per se would tend to 
slow the growth of nominal wages, thus to reduce the inflation premium 
in nominal interest rates that borrowers are willing to pay, and hence, 
other things equal, to lower interest rates. The rise of the average 
European nominal interest rate is thus doubly hard to square with the 
Keynesian fiscal hypothesis. 
In orthodox theory, the sole defensible ground left for the Keynesian 
fiscal hypothesis is the position that had Europe not shifted (or had it 
shifted less) to its tighter fiscal policy, output, interest rates, and the 
velocity of money would have gone still higher. This more complex 
hypothesis requires at least one other contractionary shock besides fiscal 
tightness-one that raises nominal interest rates while it contracts 
employment. If there were none, the fiscal push toward lower employ- 
ment would imply a fall of interest rates, when, in fact, they rose.5 There 
has to be a contractionary shift in the supply or demand for real cash 
balances, due to disturbances to the supply price of output or to pure 
monetary shocks. 
It is apparently necessary to conclude that the proposed Keynesian 
explanation, fiscal tightness, is seriously incomplete or that the orthodox 
theory of how fiscal policy affects the economy is seriously inadequate. 
An implication of the analysis that follows is that in fact both conclusions 
are correct. 
The favored solution to the puzzle in Europe itself is what we might 
call the Pigouvian solution. It is really a class of solutions all resting on 
the hypothesis of what has come to be called real wage rigidity. That 
hypothesis, though it can be traced back to Pigou, presumably draws 
some of its current inspiration from the early formulations of implicit or 
explicit employment contracts in which no motive arises for anything 
less than full indexation of the contractual nominal wage to the consumer 
price index. Since European labor markets are characterized by immo- 
bility, which makes long-term contracts desirable, and since the Euro- 
pean labor force is heavily unionized, which means that the institutional 
apparatus for the implementation and enforcement of contracts is at 
5. The other disturbances must not all be describable as upward shifts of the IS curve, 
the LM curve unchanged; otherwise, the interest rate and employment would still be 
implied to move up or down together, contrary to observation. The LM curve must shift 
in. 
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hand, Europe is fertile ground for the hypothesis that the money wage 
rates of existing employees will insistently keep pace with the consumer 
price level even when supply shocks or other real shocks render the real 
wage invariance inconsistent with employees' continuation at work with 
full pay. In this view, only new entrants can lever the average real wage 
upward or downward. 
Economists who have examined and endorsed this hypothesis com- 
pare the real wage (conceptually, the wage in terms of consumables) 
with the high-employment wage as proxied by an estimate of the marginal 
productivity of labor (also expressed in consumables). If the real wage 
somehow rises- "rigidity" here is an ill-chosen term for resilience, 
since an optimal response of the real wage to the change in some elas- 
ticity or even sheer animal spirits is not really precluded-or the marginal 
productivity falls, this widening of the "real wage gap," the percentage 
excess of real wage over marginal product, is hypothesized to explain 
the associated fall of employment. 
Some updated calculations of the real wage gaps in European countries 
in the 1980s have recently been reported by Michael Bruno, based on 
work with Jeffrey Sachs.6 The calculations, shown in table 4 after a 
rebasing to 1973, are cited by both Bruno and Sachs as evidence that 
despite "adverse supply shocks," the wage gap "remains high in most 
European economies. "' However, the evidence fails to explain why 
unemployment in Europe, major and minor countries alike, was so much 
higher even as late as 1983, 1984, and 1985 than it was in 1979-80. For 
the six countries for which Bruno could make complete calculations, 
five-Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark-had markedly 
lower real wage gaps by 1983 than they had in 1979, although unemploy- 
ment rates were vastly higher. Indeed, by 1983 two of them-Italy and 
Sweden-had returned to and even bettered their wage gap marks of 
1973. Denmark, too, nearly returned to 1973 levels. Nevertheless, it 
remains possible that one can find other evidence of adverse supply 
6. Michael Bruno, "Aggregate Supply and Demand Factors in OECD Unemployment: 
An Update," Economica, vol. 53 (Supplement, 1986), pp. S535-S552. See also the 
discussion of the real wage gap in Jeffrey Sachs, "High Unemployment in Europe," 
Working Paper 1830 (National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1986). The basic 
methods are in Bruno and Sachs, Economics of Worldwide Stagflation (Harvard University 
Press, 1985). 
7. Sachs, "High Unemployment in Europe," p. 20. 
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effects from external or internal shocks, evidence not manifest in the 
neoclassical and highly aggregative investigations of the role of real 
wages that have thus far been undertaken. 
The gap method seems too unreliable, in fact, to warrant treating the 
evidence it generates as decisive. An increase in the gap is neither 
necessary nor sufficient as an indication of supply-side effects acting to 
contract employment. An employment-contracting demand disturbance 
may push up the average real wage in the process, because prices are 
faster to respond than are wages, as Keynes supposed in his General 
Theory, or because the workers laid off are disproportionately from 
among the low-paid, but that is not sufficient evidence of a rise in 
anyone's real asking price at high (full) employment or a fall of anyone's 
marginal product at full employment.8 The gap methodology must hope 
that employment declines initiated by supply-type shocks will be evi- 
denced by unusually large rises in the real wage gap, but not all such 
shocks raise the real wage gap. An upward disturbance to price markups, 
for example, will presumably contract employment; but such a rise of 
markups will reduce or leave unchanged the real wage gap because it 
will presumably reduce or leave unchanged the real wage, depending on 
the degree of indexation, and leave unaffected labor's marginal product. 
Table 4. Real Wage Gaps, Europe and the United States, Selected Years, 1979-83 
Percent, 1973 = 0 
Country 1979 1981 1983 
Belgium 23.6 27.1 n.a. 
Denmark 9.5 8.3 1.1 
France 11.1 14.7 n.a. 
Germany 8.1 11.9 5.7 
Italy -3.6 -6.3 -9.5 
Norway 18.6 9.0 7.5 
Sweden 3.6 1.2 -4.4 
United Kingdom 11.8 19.5 21.8 
United States 0.8 2.1 2.4 
Source: Adapted from Michael Bruno, "Aggregate Supply and Demand Factors in OECD Unemployment: An 
Update," Economica, vol. 53 (Supplement, 1986), pp. S535-S552. 
n.a. Not available. 
8. For a comprehensive study, see Jean-Paul Fitoussi and others, "Real Wages and 
Unemployment," Report to the European Economic Community (Brussels, December 
1985). 
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We conclude that the wage gap evidence leaves open a huge range of 
possibilities. It could be, as we discuss below, that there has been a fall 
in the real price of investment goods during the 1980s, which tends by 
itself to raise the product wage and thus the wage gap, but that the effect 
has been covered up and possibly offset by a rise of markups. 
In view of the diminished barriers and market imperfections affecting 
the international flow of goods and capital in recent decades, and the 
consequently heightened sense of international interdependence, it is 
understandable that early in the discussion of Europe's unemployment 
problem the U.S. recession came under suspicion as a major cause of 
Europe's slump. But the circumstantial evidence pointing to the Amer- 
ican slump collapsed as America began to recover while Europe did not. 
If America's slump were the source of Europe's, recovery in America 
would produce recovery in Europe. A locomotive that can push a train 
in reverse will certainly pull it when put in forward gear. 
When analysts probing the question of American influence considered 
the specific fiscal and monetary shocks thought to underlie the recession 
and recovery in America, conventional open-economy macroeconomic 
analysis did not give the "right" results for the claim that U.S. policies 
were hurting Europe. The orthodox macroeconomic model of the 
operative international transmission mechanisms interprets the policy 
shifts in America-the tighter money and the fiscal stimuli-as stimula- 
tive, not contractionary, for the rest of the world. In the standard two- 
country extension of the Mundell-Fleming model of open Keynesian- 
type economies, any foreign fiscal stimulus to foreign expenditure, in 
pulling up the "world" real interest rate, boosts the nominal interest 
rate and thus also the velocity of money not only in the foreign country 
but in the home country as well; given the money supply at home, the 
foreign stimulus thereby generates an export-led expansion of output 
and employment at home, supported by the needed depreciation of the 
home currency.9 In this same orthodox model, a foreign shift to tight 
money shunts some foreign expenditure to the home country and drives 
up the world real rate of interest; given the home money supply, the 
resulting rise of the nominal interest rate at home and the velocity of 
money at home generates an export-led expansion of home output, 
9. Robert A. Mundell, "A Reply: Capital Mobility and Size," Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, vol. 30 (August 1964), pp. 421-31. 
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likewise supported by a depreciation of the home currency. On this 
theory, then, both elements of the American fiscal-monetary mix were 
expansionary for Europe.'0 
A plan of escape from the disconcerting implications of the orthodox 
international model has been conceived in the recent literature. It is 
theoretically possible that the reduction in the quantity of money 
demanded due to higher interest rates-the orthodox channel bringing 
stimulus to the home country-is outweighed by the rise of the price of 
"the imported good" in the "home country" (that is, Europe) due to the 
appreciation of the foreign currency (the dollar) resulting from the fiscal 
stimulus and tight money policy mix abroad (that is, in America); that 
price rise increases the home demand for money at each level of home 
output (gross domestic product) and interest rate, thereby contracting 
employment." It is also theoretically possible that the expansionary 
effect of the policy mix abroad is offset by the rise in the price of the 
intermediate goods imported from abroad, again due to foreign currency 
appreciation; that price rise, in pushing up the supply price of home 
output at given nominal wage rates, likewise increases the home country 
demand for money and is thereby a contractionary influence on employ- 
ment at home.'2 There is the additional possibility that the rise in the 
home country's consumer price index due to the above two price effects 
10. The argument urns on the semi-reduced form LM equation in which the demand 
(MD) for the existing stock of money, M, is a Hicksian function of gross domestic product, 
Z, the associated GDP deflator, Pz, and the nominal interest rate given by the world real 
rate, r*, plus the expected rate of domestic inflation, pe, which, like the price level, Pz, is 
a (nondecreasing) function of employment, N. 
MD = PZ(N)L[Z(N), r* + p9(N)], dN/dr* = -(aMD/aN)- IL2PZ > O. 
A state-of-the-art analysis distinguishes between the American product interest rate and 
the European product interest rate, and must make the proviso that the latter does not fall 
despite the rise of the former. See the appendix to Maurice Obstfeld, "Floating Exchange 
Rates: Experience and Prospects, " BPEA, 2:1985, pp. 369-450. Note also that tight money 
without fiscal stimulus might lower both product rates if the American IS curve is upward 
sloping. 
11. See, for example, William H. Branson and Willem H. Buiter, "Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy with Flexible Exchange Rates," in Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Bluford H. 
Putnam, with Jay Levin, eds., Economic Interdependence and Flexible Exchange Rates 
(M.I.T. Press, 1983), pp. 251-85. 
12. Betty C. Daniel, "The International Transmission of Economic Disturbances 
under Flexible Exchange Rates," International Economic Review, vol. 22 (October 1981), 
pp. 491-509. 
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will then drive up home wage costs owing to indexation arrangements, 
explicit or implicit, in private contracts or public legislation; such cost 
increases clearly add to the contractionary influence upon employment 
in the home country and will be the decisive factor if the degree of 
indexation, or degree of real wage rigidity, is close enough to one.'3 
But is Europe, whose gross product and productivity roughly equal 
those of the United States and whose list of products and output mix are 
not terribly dissimilar, "dependent" upon America through these trade 
channels to an important degree? A critical degree? Certainly the 
European consumer is a net importer of a few American-made goods- 
films and aircraft, among others-and the European producer relies on 
the importation from America (or American competitors) of such inputs 
as oil and natural gas. But it is implausible that a rise of, say, 20 percent 
in the price of imports amounting to, say, 5 percent of gross product 
might cause employment to fall from 94 to 89 percent of the labor force 
and output to fall by a much larger percentage amount. Moreover, since 
starting its descent in the spring of 1985, the dollar has moved back to 
the real exchange rate prevailing at the beginning of the decade, yet the 
European economy, though it may have started a partial recovery, has 
not shown remotely the degree of improvement that the import depend- 
ency hypothesis would lead us to expect. The conclusion seems inescap- 
able that trade dependency cannot be the channel through which the 
American policy mix is largely or significantly responsible for the slump 
in Europe. Yet nothing in this conclusion rules out the possibility that 
the U.S. policy mix is nevertheless a principal source of that slump. In 
what follows we point out other channels through which the policies 
adopted in the United States must have played a big role. 
New Hypotheses of Interdependence 
Our thesis is that the fiscal and monetary disturbances occurring in 
the United States in the early 1980s did indeed cause much, perhaps 
most, of the rise of European unemployment in the years 1981 to 1984. 
The shocks in question were the renewed shift to tight money around 
1981; the three-stage "Reagan tax cut" on personal incomes in 1982, 
13. See, for example, Victor Argy and Joanne Salop, "Price and Output Effects of 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy under Flexible Exchange Rates," International Monetary 
Fund Staff Papers, vol. 26 (June 1979), pp. 224-56. 
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1983, and 1984; and the investment tax inducements legislated in 1981 
and amended in 1982. 
We reach this conclusion from a consideration of the many supply- 
side transmission mechanisms, heretofore unnoticed, that must have 
been actuated by the American policy mix through channels other than 
trade dependency. We argue that, primarily through the channel of the 
real interest rate but through other channels as well, the policy shocks 
in America had impacts in Europe upon the markup in customer markets, 
the real price of investment goods output, and the demand for capital 
and for hoarded labor. These effects in turn had serious repercussions 
on European employment. These neglected mechanisms of interdepend- 
ence go a long way toward explaining the recent slump in Europe. The 
remaining part must be explained by a reexamination of Europe's own 
policies. 
EFFECTS ON PRICE MARKUPS 
One such mechanism rests upon a view of Europe and America as 
competing, actually or potentially, in customer markets rather than 
perfect, or perfectly informed, markets. In this view, firms setting their 
markups need not obey the classical law of one price. Differently situated 
firms may be satisfied with different prices for a time; only with the slow 
drift of customers from higher-priced to lower-priced firms as information 
spreads is there a tendency toward one price. Moreover, in this frictional 
environment, prices are not competed down to the classical level as long 
as real interest rates are positive, since a firm's investments in market 
share are subject to diminishing returns like any other investment; prices 
thus remain above marginal cost and pure profits persist. 14 To facilitate 
the extension of this theory to international markets we suppose that 
arbitrage costs are low enough to force the individual firm to set just 
''one price" across markets. 
In the customer-market model detailed in our forthcoming book, the 
American policy mix had an adverse impact on the markup required by 
European firms competing for customers against American firms in 
14. For the basic model see Edmund S. Phelps and Sidney G. Winter, Jr., "Optimal 
Price Policy under Atomistic Competition," in Phelps and others, Microeconomic Foun- 
dations of Employment and Inflation Theory (Norton, 1970), pp. 309-37. Some important 
empirical findings favorable to the theory are given in Robert E. Hall, "Market Structure 
and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," in this issue of BPEA. ? 
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world markets. The real rate of interest expected by firms was perhaps 
the major channel here. The unprecedentedly strong rise of real interest 
rates around 1981-82 to record-setting levels in both the United States 
and Europe, reported in table 5, can be attributed largely to the American 
fiscal stimulus, especially the new investment subsidies. The American 
shift to tighter money may also have played a part in 1980 and beyond, 
though it is doubtful that this tool could hold up real rates for very long; 
it would instead depress employment until real rates were pulled back 
to normal, or possibly below. The sharp elevation of actual and, 
presumably, of expected real interest rates, we argue, induced firms in 
Europe to widen their markups since it increased the opportunity cost 
of "investing" in greater or maintained market share through restraint 
in present prices at a sacrifice in present cash flow. There being no 
important demand stimulus to offset it, the result of the price push was 
a fall of employment in Europe. 
A significant piece of evidence that this increase in markups occurred 
is the percentage change between 1981 and 1984 in the share of income 
going to wages: 
France Germany Italy United Kingdom United States 
-2.6 -4.7 -1.2 -4.0 -0.5 
As is well known, during the 1970s, when real interest rates fell to record 
lows, labor's relative share was rising to postwar highs. Customer- 
market theory takes the mystery out of this unusual fluctuation in shares. 
The aggregate share data point to a much smaller rise of markups by 
American firms, if indeed any rise at all. The customer-market model 
actually predicts the disparity between the European and U.S. markups 
and even allows for a net fall of the American markup. The explanation 
lies in a second transmission channel, the real exchange rate between 
Europe and America. In our model, fiscal stimulus and tight money in 
America both generate a nominal appreciation of the dollar against the 
European currency. The implied loss of competitiveness and consequent 
prospect of losing customers to overseas competitors induces the Amer- 
ican firms, other things equal, to shave their markups and thus to 
moderate the prospective erosion of their market share. 15 The remaining 
15. This connection is the focus of a one-country model in Edmund Phelps, "The 
Significance of Customer Markets for the Effects of Budgetary Policy in Open Economies, " 
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, vol. 3 (September 1986) pp. 101-117. 
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loss of competitiveness, which the reduction of America's markup 
relative to Europe's is insufficient to offset, is an implied gain of 
competitiveness for European firms. That windfall gain induces the 
European firms to widen their markups and thus to slow the prospective 
rise in their market share. Since neither set of firms completely offsets 
the change of their competitiveness in their markup responses, the 
implication is a real as well as nominal appreciation of the dollar. Hence, 
the two forces-real interest rates and real exchange rates-both pulled 
the European markup in the same upward direction, but pulled the 
American markup in opposing directions. It in no way weakens the 
theory, therefore, to find evidence, shown in table 6, of an actual decrease 
of the markup by American firms in manufacturing, transportation, and 
communication industries, a sector that is highly exposed to foreign 
competition. The same table also gives evidence of a stronger rise of the 
European markup in that sector than in the economy as a whole, as 
predicted. 
The resulting shock to the supply price of output in Europe-the GDP 
deflator that businesses require to supply a given amount of domestic 
product-contracts employment in the standard way: the implied reduc- 
tion of deflated, or real, cash balances, or liquidity, means a decline in 
the volume of output that the available liquidity will support.'6 The 
investment goods demanded by domestic firms from domestic firms 
must be reduced by a higher product interest rate or lessened real 
Table 5. Long-Term Real Interest Rates, Europe and the United States, 1980-84a 
Percent 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
France 0.8 2.4 6.2 5.0 5.9 
Germany 2.9 5.0 5.8 4.9 5.4 
Italy - 3.6 -0.7 5.9 4.6 4.4 
United Kingdom -0.1 5.5 7.3 6.1 5.8 
United States 2.0 6.8 8.7 8.0 9.0 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 1984 (April 1985), table 2-7. 
a. Annual averages of excess of nominal rate over expected inflation. Expected inflation is proxied by a weighted 
average of the rate of inflation in the current quarter and the next two quarters, with the deflator of private final domestic 
demand being used as the price variable. 
16. Loosely put, the price deflator belonging in the semireduced-form LM equation is 
now some function P,(N; r*, e) containing the foreign real interest rate, r*, and the real 
exchange rate, e. Both are driven up by the American policy mix, and both effects drive 
up Pz. 
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currency depreciation in order to clear the goods market. If in addition 
wages are to some degree tied to the consumer price index, which is also 
pushed up, the wage rise thus induced contributes a separate contrac- 
tionary effect on employment. Of course, these two supply effects, both 
contractionary, may be opposed by an expansionary demand effect of 
the American policy mix, such as the orthodox demand-based model 
describes. But it is quite possible, indeed likely, that the supply effect 
will ultimately overcome the demand effect. That must be the outcome 
if the degree of wage indexation is sufficiently close to one or if the 
excess-supply-of-money function is sufficiently close to being perfectly 
inelastic. 
THE PRICE OF INVESTMENT GOODS 
Another way in which the American policy shifts contracted employ- 
ment in Europe, at least in the early years, involves an altogether 
different mechanism and thus another model. The key variable is the 
relative price, or real price, of investment goods, but because a fall of 
the real price in Europe is inextricably linked to a rise of the real rate of 
interest in Europe, the latter is once again a channel through which the 
foreign disturbance is transmitted. A key notion is that in Europe, private 
contracts or public policy cause nominal wage rates to be tied, explicitly 
or implicitly, to the consumer price index, but not to any index of the 
price of capital goods. It will pay in understanding if we stylize the story 
to the hilt. 
We begin with a particular two-sector model of a two-country world 
of Europe and America in which a single investment good and a single 
Table 6. Departure of the Price-Wage Markup from Its 1970-80 Trend, Manufacturing, 
Transportation, and Communications Sector, Europe and the United States, 1981-84 
Percentage point departure from trend 
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 
France 3.13 2.86 5.97 10.91 
Germany - 3.89 0.83 9.35 n.a. 
Italy 5.31 5.13 1.32 8.94 
United Kingdom 9.95 17.12 24.47 30.76 
United States - 2.27 - 6.60 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from OECD, National Accounts, 1972-84, vol. 2, Detailed Tables. 
n.a. Not available. 
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consumer good are tradable in perfect, not customer, markets. In this 
model with complete tradability, the tight money shock in America, in 
causing a nominal appreciation of the dollar, tends to switch consumer 
demand to Europe, raising demand and prices there. But if we suppose 
full wage indexation in Europe, wages chase after the consumer price- 
the product wage in the consumer goods industry refuses to give-so 
consumer goods output resists increasing in Europe. If we further 
suppose that the "Reagan tax cut" stabilizes American consumer 
demand while Europe's "welfare state" insulates European consumer 
demand from any rise of unemployment or other loss of real income, it 
then follows by arithmetic that consumer goods output in America must 
also be resistant to the monetary shock. Hence, the shift to tight money 
in America reduces aggregate employment only by driving demand 
downward and inward along the Marshallian supply curve of America's 
capital goods industry-reducing the real price of U. S. investment goods 
and also, by the law of one price, the real world price of investment 
goods. The fall in the real world price of the investment good decreases 
the output of Europe's investment good industry as well. On Europe's 
side of the ocean, it might be hoted, it is a purely nonmonetary mechanism 
contracting aggregate employment through the product wage in the 
investment goods sector. (The effect may fail to turn up in wage gap data 
if it is offset or outweighed by effects on markups of the sort analyzed in 
the customer-market model.) 
This model with complete tradability portrays America and Europe 
as moving into the slump together, with more or less equal incidence. It 
also suggests that if America is rescued from its slump by money wage 
adjustment or by new investment subsidies, to which there might be a 
lagged response, so that investment expenditure in America recovers, 
then Europe and America will likewise come out of the slump together. 
In fact, there seems to have been a recovery of investment expenditure 
in the United States by 1985 alongside a presumably incomplete recovery 
from the slump, while Europe's slump continued unabated. 
Our two-sector theory can accommodate this observed asymmetry, 
however, with the introduction of a nontradable capital good produced 
at least in Europe. In this model with incomplete tradability, the rise in 
the expected real rate of interest brought about by the new U.S. 
investment subsidies limits the expansion of demand and output for any 
nontradable investment goods produced in America, but causes a 
502 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
contraction of demand and thus a decline of the real price and the output 
of the nontradable investment goods produced in Europe, since no new 
European subsidy offsets the increased real interest cost there. 
Of course, such a stylized model is certain to be inaccurate. A critical 
step in the line of theorizing, for example, is the assumption that increased 
employment in the consumer goods sector serving to offset reduced 
employment in the investment goods sector would require a reduction 
of the product wage, which is impossible since the product wage is also 
the real wage, which is made sticky by full indexation. In fact, indexation 
in Europe is less than full. Further, any shiftability of the inputs of 
existing capital goods in Europe to the consumer goods sector would 
tend to boost the product wage in the latter sector and thus permit some 
increase of employment in that sector, real wage stickiness notwith- 
standing. Complete shiftability might eliminate any possibility of declines 
in real prices and in employment in the capital goods sector. So it is of 
interest to check both U.S. and European real prices of investment 
goods output. As table 7 shows, the price declines generally, as predicted. 
But the decline in Germany is too slight to be important. The prediction 
by the model that the relative price in Europe remains depressed along 
with the economy is borne out, but the further worsening of the relative 
price in the United States is anomalous. The measurement of quality- 
adjusted capital goods prices is notoriously problematic, though, so 
some of the anomalies may reflect data problems. 
EFFECTS ON THREE KINDS OF CAPITAL 
The last of our three broad explanations of the decline of European 
employment focuses on the effect of the sharp rise in real interest rates 
produced by the American policy mix on Europe's capital-in all its 
Table 7. Real Price of Investment Goods Output, Europe and United States, 1981-85 
Percentage deviation from 1970-80 trend values 
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
France - 3.82 - 4.46 - 6.46 - 7.36 -9.03 
Germany -0.43 -0.20 -0.10 n.a. n.a. 
Italy - 7.45 -10.67 -13.88 n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom - 6.98 - 7.99 - 7.98 - 7.65 - 6.35 
United States - 5.78 - 8.73 - 11.03 - 14.05 - 17.28 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from OECD, National Accounts, 1972-84, vol. 2, Detailed Tables, and 
Quarterly National Accounts, various issues. 
n.a. Not available. 
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various dimensions. The impact of increased interest rates on capital 
may not have been very important at first, but since it is cumulative, it 
may now be the most important of all. 
In one of the transmission mechanisms at work here, the real interest 
rate impinges directly upon employment because a firm's stock of 
employees is like an investment in that it involves rising marginal 
recruitment and training costs. The employee stock is also like capital 
in that there is typically a reserve amount of it serving as spare capacity 
to meet unforeseen surges of demand. Hence, when the expected real 
interest rate increases, causing the future to be discounted more heavily, 
the firm seeking to maximize the discounted stream of profits must lay 
off, discharge, or early-retire some employees or else reduce the rate of 
new hiring. Our forthcoming monograph points out the sharp decrease 
of labor hoarding in Europe in late 1981 and 1982 and the resulting rise 
of output per employee following the sharp rise of real interest rates. 
Another such mechanism involves investment in working capital. A 
rise of the real interest rate increases the cost of the working capital that 
any given amount of labor needs or at any rate will have available in 
order to produce. As a consequence, the supply price of output at the 
normal employment level is increased, given the prevailing money wage. 
If, in addition, there is some positive degree of wage indexation to the 
price level, this resistance to a real wage cut imparts a contractionary 
influence on employment of its own. 17 
A similar mechanism involves fixed capital. The American personal 
income tax cuts, in curtailing U.S. domestic saving, and the aggregate 
rise in American public spending, in diverting saving from investment, 
have tended, taken alone, to lessen world investment; and insofar as 
countries have permitted capital to be mobile, the world capital market 
has meted out cutbacks in every country. Furthermore, the American 
fiscal stimuli to investment have diverted to the United States a portion 
of world investment that would otherwise have been located elsewhere. 
The rise of real interest rates in Europe is the instrument by which the 
world capital market is reallocating capital to American shores.18 As 
17. The contractionary effects of the real interest rate are studied in Domingo Cavallo, 
"The Stagflationary Effect of Monetary Stabilization Policy in Economies with Persistent 
Inflation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, April 1977). 
18. The drain on Europe's capital stock is emphasized in Edmund S. Phelps, "Ap- 
praising the American Fiscal Stance," Temi di Discussione 56 (Banca d'Italia, Rome, 
November 1985). 
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fixed capital gradually leaves Europe, it drives up the supply price of 
output, given some money wage level, although it also drives up the 
demand price for output, given the supply of money. In a Keynesian 
model positing some source of stickiness in the behavior of the average 
money wage, it is quite plausible that the supply effect prevails over the 
demand effect, with the net result that employment contracts.19 Again, 
if money wages are indexed to a degree to the consumer price level, 
there is an additional induced rise of the supply price of output and an 
independent contractionary effect on employment arising from this 
connection. Indeed, if wages were fully indexed to the consumer price 
level, the decline in the marginal productivity of labor brought about by 
the erosion of the capital stock would collide with the sticky real wage 
to cause a certain decline of employment. 
Still other mechanisms triggered by the increase of the real rate of 
interest tend to contract employment. Because of the increased risk of 
bankruptcy, the most endangered firms may face prohibitive borrowing 
terms or even credit rationing. Also, reduced cash flow constricts equity- 
financed investment. The gradual impairment of productivity that results 
may in time force such firms to shut down. Employment of overhead 
labor in the economy as a whole thus declines as entire plants or firms 
disappear, even if aggregate output and aggregate direct-labor employ- 
ment holds up. (The closing of such firms and plants is not a clear welfare 
gain, contrary to shortsighted analysis, since they will not be there if and 
when their capacity is again in demand.) However, the rise in the supply 
price of output induced by this slowdown of capital formation also acts 
to contract output and, as other supply shocks may do, quite possibly to 
contract employment as well. 
Europe's Own Policies Reexamined 
It is only reasonable, in a total accounting for the slump in Europe, to 
leave some room for Europe's own macroeconomic policies. But for 
which policies? As noted earlier, the conventional view that Europe's 
19. The analysis of a capital-stock shock along these lines has close parallels to the 
analysis of an "oil shock" in Edmund S. Phelps, "Commodity-Supply Shock and Full- 
Employment Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 10 (May 
1978), pp. 206-21. 
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tight fiscal policy is to blame for the slump is certainly faulty in the 
orthodox theory, for on such a theory there would have been a fall of 
interest rates, not a rise, if European fiscal tightening had been the main 
contractionary disturbance. At best, on the orthodox theory, the fiscal 
hypothesis is insufficient, other hypotheses being needed in addition. 
But how important or unimportant is it? 
At worst, on orthodox theory, the European fiscal hypothesis is dead 
wrong. Europe's tightness cannot be said to be even a cause, let alone 
the whole cause. That would be the case if the European shift toward 
tightness in the early 1980s, with its consequent downward effect on 
both worldwide nominal interest rates and worldwide employment, had 
been offset or outweighed by the American shift in the same period 
toward stimulus through the personal income tax cuts and through the 
income effects of the fiscal incentives to invest. Calculations of the 
inflation-adjusted structural budget surpluses in excess of 1980 levels, 
expressed as a percentage of high-employment GDP, suggest that there 
has been such an offset:20 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
France, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom - 1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.9 -0.6 
United States 0.4 -1.4 -2.2 -2.4 -2.9 
Weighted sum -0.3 - 1.0 -1.4 -1.7 -1.8 
The worst case of all for the fiscal hypothesis would arise if fiscal 
tightening in Europe were incapable of reducing the world real interest 
rate and as a consequence unable to reduce the nominal interest rate and 
thus the velocity of money in Europe. In that case, exports and import- 
competing production would swell up, in the reverse of export crowding 
out, to take the place of the withdrawn fiscal stimulus, which would thus 
be ineffective. (This is the small-country flexible rate case in the Mundell- 
Fleming model.) 
Ourunorthodox theories imply that both these cases are too extreme- 
that fiscal tightening in Europe did make a difference for European 
employment and that the contractionary influence was not simply a 
negative demand effect offset by the positive demand effect of America's 
fiscal easing. 
20. We weighted the corresponding data for France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom by their 1980 GDPs to get the average for that group. 
506 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
The view that Europe's budgetary surplus was "offset" by America's 
budgetary deficit ignores customer markets. A $150 billion surplus in 
Europe and a deficit of that amount in the United States do not cancel 
each other out in the customer-market model since both disturbances 
cause real depreciations of the European currencies. A European 
country's fiscal austerity, in weakening its currency, induces its produc- 
ers to push up their markups, with contractionary effects on employment 
due to reduced real cash balances. This is additive to the real depreciation 
already caused by U.S. policies. It is immediately clear that the above 
"worst case" founders on the same limitation. Even if the European 
full-employment surplus is small in the global scale of things-what is 
$150 billion put next to world wealth and world capital?-the resulting 
Belgian franc depreciation matters for Belgian firms. 
The above two extreme cases, in which European fiscal tightness 
cannot be said to be a cause of European unemployment, also ignore the 
likely transience of the swings in the real exchange rate. If the dollar is 
expected with time to retreat, the real interest rate, adjusted for the 
inflation expected in relative prices (what might be called the product 
interest rate), is thus elevated in America and depressed in Europe. This 
reduction in the European product interest rates tends to pull down the 
nominal interest rate and with it the velocity of money in Europe, and 
reduces employment there.21 The customer-market model gives a ration- 
ale for expecting that Europe's real exchange rate will tend to come 
back. The slow migration of customers from American firms to European 
firms tends to pull it back and simultaneously to bring back the law of 
one price. Another rationale is the impoverishment of the United States 
by its fiscal prodigality and the enrichment of the rest of the world. An 
exodus of wealth hurts the relative price of home-produced nontradable 
goods. 
It can now be seen that, in our customer-market model, a European 
fiscal tightening that approaches the American fiscal easing moderates 
the resulting worldwide rise of real interest rates and, even more, the 
product interest rate in Europe. In this respect, Europe's tightening 
acted to moderate the contractionary rise of markups in Europe. But 
this mechanism is only one of those governing the net effect of Europe's 
21. A one-country model displaying these results is presented in Phelps, "The 
Significance of Customer Markets." 
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fiscal stance on Europe's employment. Our customer-market model 
shows that an increased fiscal stimulus or decreased fiscal tightening by 
a country, even a country large enough to drive up world real rates of 
interest, would be expansionary at home whether or not contractionary 
abroad through the supply-price effects discussed in the previous section. 
Some of the domestic expansionary effect is "stolen" from abroad, and 
the effect on world output may be weak owing to global crowding out, 
or even negative if global supply-price effects swamp global demand 
effects.22 
Europe's own tight money policy may also have had a role in the 
recent slump. Because Europe's slump coupled reduced employment 
with higher interest rates, nominal as well as real, it is inescapable that 
there occurred a decrease in the supply of real cash balances or an 
increase in the demand for real balances-hence an inward shift of the 
LM curve of Europe; otherwise, both interest rate and employment are 
up or both down, contrary to the facts. The foregoing supply-price 
mechanisms are one class of reasons for believing that the real supply of 
cash balances declined. (The European product deflator, with which the 
nominal money supply is deflated in the supply-and-demand-for-money 
equation, rose a few percentage points relative to the downward trend 
around 1981 when the new set of American policies was being intro- 
duced.) But another way for the real supply of cash balances to be shrunk 
is through slowing of the growth rate of the money supply. Shown below 
are the growth rates of the money supplies in the four major countries of 
Europe and in the United States. 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
France, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom 13.3 12.8 10.1 10.8 10.0 10.1 8.3 9.0 
United States 8.5 8.3 8.0 9.4 9.3 12.5 8.0 9.1 
There is a surprising similarity here, but Europe did not receive the 
dollop of liquidity in 1983 that the United States did, and these growth 
rates of the broad money stock have to be weighed against a much slower 
decline of the inflation rate in Europe than in the United States. 
The final question that must occupy us, then, is why Europe has 
22. We have not discussed here the implications of our two-sector model regarding the 
effectiveness of increased public spending and tax cuts, which are not uniformly conven- 
tional. 
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adopted a generally tight fiscal policy and a monetary policy that seems 
to have been, subject to the vicissitudes of financial innovation and 
random meanderings in the velocity of money time series, tighter during 
1981-85 than the American policy. 
The Persistence of the European Unemployment 
National unemployment rates commonly exhibit a certain amount of 
serial correlation, or autoregressivity, familiarly called persistence. As 
Keynes cautiously observed in his General Theory, it does not generally 
happen that, at some point after a disturbance, prices and quantities 
spurt to their new equilibrium positions. Two reasons for this phenom- 
enon, search costs and nonsynchronization in wage or price setting, 
have been understood as far back as the beginnings of natural rate theory. 
If, owing to a barrage of shocks and an episode of disequilibrium 
confusion, workers are no longer in their long-run allocation over the 
firms in the economy, achievement of that allocation will involve a 
lengthy search; there will be from this initial point an equilibrium path 
along which the initially excessive structural unemployment is only 
gradually worked down to the steady state. (The term equilibrium here 
denotes a correct-expectations, or surprise-free, scenario.) The recovery 
is also made gradual, of course, if market circumstances dictate nonsyn- 
chronous, or staggered, wage or price setting and thus an overhang at 
each moment of old commitments. Later, certain nonlinearities were 
brought in as an explanation of serial persistence. It would be premature 
to conclude from the recent experience that there is no truth, or very 
little, in these standard models, which are associated, somewhat by 
coincidence, with natural rate theory. But the recent failure of employ- 
ment conditions to improve until at least 1986, the sixth year of the 
recent slump, seems to require new explanatory elements. 
Our vision of the persistence of unemployment in Europe posits a 
considerable degree of real wage stickiness, whether loosely imple- 
mented through private understandings or enforced by public provisions 
for indexation. If, to take the extreme case, the real wage of an employee 
is a constant and if, as a consequence, the real cost savings (also 
expressed in consumer goods) to the firm of laying off an employee, 
which is the true cost of using the employee in production in view of any 
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benefits paid to the laid off, is likewise a constant, in the sense of having 
been earlier predetermined for the course of his employment, a decline 
in the real marginal-revenue productivity of labor as a result of devel- 
opments such as a rise of markups, a real depreciation of the currency, 
a fall of the real price of capital goods output, or a contraction of the 
capital stock will cause some employees to be laid off. Further, unless 
the real marginal productivity schedule is restored, laid-off workers will 
remain laid off for the balance of their years as employees. In this extreme 
case of real wage stickiness, it is only the entrance of new workers, 
insofar as they can make deals for employment at reduced real wages in 
view of the reduced marginal-revenue productivity of labor, that will 
erode the average value of the real wage; but this statistical adjustment 
will do nothing to put laid-off workers back to work. To the extent that 
customer markets inhibit the rise of new firms to absorb the young while 
contracts protect existing laid-off employees from being passed over for 
recall in favor of hires of cheaper workers from the outside, new entrants 
will end up bearing a share of the economy's unemployment-indeed an 
increasing share as new entrants accumulate and the laid-off take the 
places of retiring workers.23 
In the expectational sense, the equilibrium unemployment rate is thus 
increased, and the natural rate with it. Yet their "long-run" values need 
not have increased. (Also, it is not implied that the equilibrium rate 
increased as much as the actual rate.) 
This extreme view of labor markets in Europe is, of course, oversim- 
plified. Real wages do not move sluggishly in Europe; they appear to 
jump a bit. Relatedly, formal wage arrangements in Europe do not 
provide full indexation; countries there differ in the degree of indexation. 
Nor is there anywhere in the theoretical literature a complete rationale 
for the use of such employment contracts or more general versions of 
them. 
If our theory is right, the promise of an end to the swollen budgetary 
deficits in the United States, with the consequent steady weakening of 
the dollar against the European currencies, together with the phasing 
out of the U.S. fiscal incentives to invest, with the consequent drop in 
23. See, for example, the overlapping-worker model in Pierre Dehez and Jean-Paul 
Fitoussi, "Wage Indexation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," in Wilfred Beckermann, 
ed., Wage Rigidity and Unemployment (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 201- 
17. 
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world real rates of interest in 1986, points toward a recovery of employ- 
ment in Europe starting in 1986. If indeed recovery occurs, it will not be 
evidence that Europe does not suffer from the severe persistence problem 
that we are inclined to infer from the recent experience. 
Some Tests of the Present Theory 
Three tests of our theories that the disturbances in the United States 
in the early 1980s contributed importantly to the slump in Europe come 
to mind immediately. 
Our emphasis upon upward disturbances to the supply price of 
European output, especially the output of consumer goods, raises the 
question of whether there is any evidence of a surge of European price 
levels in the 1980s above their generally decelerating trend. European 
GNP deflators suggest that European inflation stayed surprisingly high 
in 1981 and 1982, as shown below. 
1968-77 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
France, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom 8.2 8.7 9.0 11.1 9.8 9.4 7.2 5.6 
United States 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.6 6.5 3.8 3.9 
The same development is evident from the consumer expenditure 
deflators. Only some fraction of the increase in the supply price, it should 
be noted, will be passed on in the actual price; some of the incidence will 
be borne by the producers, with output falling precisely because neither 
buyer nor seller is willing to bear the whole burden. 
A second test is to look at regions other than Europe. After all, if the 
disturbances in the United States have been important enough to cause 
a large rise of the unemployment rate in Europe, then their effect will 
presumably also show up in employment in other market-type econom- 
ies, unless these countries have turned to expansive domestic policies. 
Unemployment rates for Canada and Japan are shown below. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Canada 7.5 7.5 11.1 11.9 11.3 10.5 
Japan 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 
The rate in Canada is vastly higher than its 1980 level even as late as 
1985. On its own much-reduced scale, Japan shows a similar dynamic. 
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The pattern does not appear to differ much in Australia and Taiwan, the 
other two countries with accessible unemployment rate series. The 
situation in Latin America is well known and apparently conforms 
broadly to the prediction here. 
Finally, some econometric results developed in our forthcoming 
monograph show that a Phillips-type regression equation to explain the 
rate of inflation in the United States, France, and Germany performs 
significantly better over the available sample period if the explanatory 
variables include both the long-term expected real rate of interest and a 
measure of the country's international competitiveness; the short-term 
real rate performed even better. These variables entered positively and 
negatively, respectively, as predicted. 
European Policy Choices, Past and Present 
Through the various channels we have cited, the American disturb- 
ances caused a rise of the consumer price level in Europe at any given 
level of employment. That price rise may have prompted an inflation- 
fighting posture on the part of the European policymaker rather than a 
stance to combat unemployment. In trading off between the steady level 
of employment and the steady rate of inflation to have, policymakers 
might prefer to give up some employment in return for a lesser elevation 
of the inflation rate.24 Alternatively, if policymakers are seen as confront- 
ing a transient bulge of the natural unemployment rate, their preference 
might be for a transient rise of actual unemployment to moderate the 
lasting, or asymptotic, inflation rate resulting.25 Martin Feldstein, among 
others, appears to view the American shocks as having this sort of 
indirect influence upon the European unemployment rate.26 
Although an interesting and perhaps ultimately useful theory, this 
24. See, for example, Arthur M. Okun, "The Role of Aggregate Demand in Alleviating 
Unemployment," in William G. Bowen and Frederick H. Harbison, eds., Unemployment 
in a Prosperous Economy, A Report of the Princeton Manpower Symposium (Princeton 
University, May 13-14, 1965), pp. 67-81. 
25. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "High Unemployment in Europe: Diagnosis and Policy Impli- 
cations," Working Paper 1830 (National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1986). 
26. Martin Feldstein, "The U.S. Budget Deficits and the European Economies: 
Resolving the Political Economy Puzzle," American Economic Review, vol. 76 (May 
1986, Papers and Proceedings, 1985), pp. 342-46. 
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view is not easy to square with the fact that the inflation rate in Europe 
has not been grudgingly allowed to rise; it has come down sharply, from 
an average of 8.9 percent in 1978-79 to an average of 5.4 percent in 
1984-85 in terms of the GNP deflator for France, Germany, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom. 
Interpreted as deliberate and errorless behavior, the slump was 
aggravated by an effort to bring down the inflation rate during an unlucky 
bulge, if not a permanent rise, in the natural rate of unemployment. An 
alternative interpretation is that the fall of the inflation rate and the 
excess slump that went with it were the result of disinflationary monetary 
and fiscal policies that accidentally went too far. In any case, actual 
unemployment was pushed above a swollen natural rate. Either way, 
the decision to allow as large a rise of the unemployment rate as was 
forecast in annual and semiannual reviews could be criticized as so 
severe a hardship on the present generation as to be unjustifiable by any 
known and respected intergenerational social welfare criterion. 
A more radical view of the European policy response is that, whatever 
its motives may have been, it bears no responsibility for the slump since 
a policy regarded as more stimulative would have done no good. Of 
course, if the rise of the unemployment rate to around 11 percent is 
interpreted as precisely the rise of the natural rate and that rate is in turn 
assumed to be permanent, the transient effectiveness of an easier 
monetary policy might be regarded as of little or no merit when the 
inflation rate was already high to begin with. But if the rise of the natural 
rate is presumed to be temporary because the disturbances are presum- 
ably temporary, then this radical view is a claim that Keynesian measures 
of demand stimulus cannot be expected to cushion the rise of the 
unemployment rate even temporarily. 
Our view is that general fiscal stimulus in Europe could exert the 
conventional expansionary demand effect upon European employment 
and an expansionary markup effect from the supply side. It would also 
have supply effects through its effect on the real interest rate and might 
reduce further the real price of investment goods, effects tending to 
reduce employment; but the net effect can be assumed to be expansion- 
ary. The predominant empirical judgment, certainly, is that fiscal stim- 
ulus does have some positive near-term employment effects. Such a 
stimulus might be used to hasten the recovery and perhaps also to 
galvanize private forces for recovery. Neither is there anything in the 
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analysis of this paper that would deny a similar role to easier money. It 
is true that the effectiveness of such stimulus would be fleeting, or 
hypertransient, if European wages were fully indexed to the consumer 
price index with small time lags. But such is not the case. Indexation is 
less than full, and some lags are long. 
Still, the disturbances transmitted to Europe from the United States 
have not fully ceased, only moderated. For a full recovery Europe may 
have to bargain for further reductions in the budgetary deficits that are 
still propping up real interest rates in the United States and the world. 
Comments 
and Discussion 
Jeffrey Sachs: The paper by J.-P. Fitoussi and E. S. Phelps is interesting 
and potentially important. Its main theme is that the U.S. policy mix of 
fiscal expansion and monetary contraction in the first half of the 1980s 
had a contractionary effect on the European economies and was a major 
factor in the rise of European unemployment. That interpretation runs 
counter to a common (though by no means universally held) view that 
the U.S. policy mix stimulated European output by inducing an appre- 
ciation of the dollar and a consequent boom in European exports. 
At the core of the debate about the international transmission of U.S. 
policies is the following issue. The U.S. policy mix both raised world 
interest rates and induced a strengthening of the dollar. The first effect 
would generally be contractionary for Europe, through a reduction in 
investment demand if nothing else, while the second effect would tend 
to be expansionary, through a rise in net exports. In the most basic 
Mundell-Fleming model, the exchange rate (that is, expansionary) effect 
necessarily dominates, leading to what the authors term the "orthodox" 
view that the U.S. policy mix has benefited Europe. The contribution of 
the authors is to introduce new channels of interest rate and exchange 
rate linkages that bolster the case that the overall effect has been 
contractionary. 
While the authors may be on to something important, the paper is 
nonetheless problematic for several reasons. First, it is not self-contained 
and is instead a sneak preview of a forthcoming monograph by the two 
authors. Thus, it is difficult to assess the precise assumptions underlying 
their analysis and the generality or persuasiveness of their arguments. 
Second, the authors offer no real empirical testing of the arguments, so 
that on a question that is known to be theoretically ambiguous (the 
direction of effect of U.S. policy on European output and employment), 
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the reader is left with a series of mostly undocumented assertions that 
certain effects have dominated other effects. Third, the authors improp- 
erly jump from their conclusion that U.S. policies have had contraction- 
ary effects on Europe to the conclusion that U.S. policy has been the 
main factor raising European unemployment. There are many additional 
factors, consistent with the authors' analysis, that could help to explain 
the European slump. 
Finally, the authors overstate the novelty of their conclusions. Many 
authors, including Michael Bruno and myself, have pointed out that the 
U.S. fiscal expansion cum monetary contraction might be expected to 
have a contractionary effect in Europe in view of Europe's high degree 
of wage indexation and its other labor market institutions conducive to 
real wage rigidity.' Thus, the "orthodox" view is somewhat less than 
orthodox after all. 
To understand the new Fitoussi and Phelps channels and how they 
compare with existing mechanisms already stressed in the literature, it 
is useful to introduce an augmented version of the static Mundell- 
Fleming model. Although the underlying Fitoussi-Phelps models (as 
they are described in words) are generally dynamic, they can at least be 
represented, albeit crudely, in this static setting. The "orthodox" model 
consists of an aggregate demand equation, an aggregate supply equation 
(or price markup equation), a money demand equation, and the assump- 
tions of perfect capital mobility and nominal wage rigidity:2 
(1) (a) q = J(e + p* - p) - ur (aggregate demand) 
(b) p = w + y (q - k) (aggregate supply) 
(c) m - p = 4q - Pr (money demand) 
(d) w = (nominal wage ridigity) 
(e) r = r* (perfect capital mobility) 
1. Bruno and I demonstrated that a fiscal expansion in one country would be negatively 
transmitted to the rest of the world under conditions of high wage indexation. See Michael 
Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, "Supply versus Demand Approaches to the Problem of 
Stagflation," in H. Giersch, ed., Macroeconomic Policies for Growth and Stability (Kiel: 
Institut fir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel, 1981); Gilles Oudiz and I discussed this 
issue at some length in "Macroeconomic Policy Coordination among the Industrial 
Economies," BPEA, 1:1984, pp. 1-64. Bruno and I also stressed the point at some length 
in Economics of Worldwide Stagflation (Harvard University Press, 1985), particularly in 
chapter 6. 
2. All variables are in logarithms, except for the (real) interest rate r. The definitions 
are: q, output; e, exchange rate in units of home currency per unit of foreign currency; p, 
price of home goods; k, capital stock (taken as fixed); m, money supply. Starred variables 
are "foreign country" variables. The variables p*, w, r*, and k are exogenous. 
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It is easy to see in this model that a rise in world interest rates, r*, is 
necessarily expansionary for the home country (we will take Europe as 
"home"). Substitute equations lb, Id, and le into ic to rewrite the 
money market equilibrium condition as: m - w = (+ + y) q - yk - 1r*. 
Thus, when r* rises, money market equilibrium requires that q also rise, 
in the amount dq = [r/(4 + y)] dr*, since m, w, and k are assumed to be 
fixed. The rise in q is brought about by a currency depreciation (de > 0). 
Money market equilibrium requires that the depreciation be large enough 
so that the expansionary demand effects of de > 0 outweigh the 
contractionary demand effects of dr*. Since both expansionary U.S. 
fiscal policies and contractionary monetary policies raise r*, each piece 
of the U.S. policy mix contributes to the home expansion in the 
"orthodox" case. 
This expansionary result can be changed by transmission channels 
that allow m, w, or k to change in response to the rise in r*, or that cause 
a wedge to be driven between changes in w and changes in p when r* 
rises. Let me briefly mention some possibilities. If the monetary author- 
ities resist the currency depreciation by reducing m, then q can fall, 
since dq = [P/(4 + y)]dr* + [1/(4 + y)]dm (still holding w, k fixed). In 
fact, it is easy to show that if m is tightened sufficiently to keep e 
unchanged after a rise in r*, then q must fall. Second, if indexed nominal 
wages rise in response to the depreciation of the currency, then, again, 
q may fall. If the consumer price index is a weighted average of home 
and foreign prices, p, = Ap + (1- A)(p* + e), and if wages are fully 
indexed, with w = p, + iw, then it is easy to show that q must fall after a 
* * 
rise in r*. 
The authors' arguments stress reasons why the markup of p over w 
might rise with a rise in r*. Suppose that marginal production costs are 
given as in equation lb, so that c = w + y(q - k), where c is the (log) 
marginal cost of production. Instead of the competitive assumption that 
p = c, the authors suppose (though apparently in a more sophisticated 
dynamic setting) that imperfectly competitive firms set prices as a 
weighted average of c and of their competitors' prices, p* + e, where 
p = 4 c + (1 - ;)(p* + e). This so-called "customer-market" view implies 
that even for unchanged output and nominal wages, p will rise after a 
rise in r*, since the currency depreciation will induce European firms to 
raise their markups. Again, starting from m - p = q - 1r*, we have 
dq = (Id/4) dr* - (114)dp. With a large enough rise in the European 
markup, European output will fall. 
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Another way that p may rise for unchanged w and q is for interest 
rates to enter the aggregate supply (that is, price) equation, in the form: 
p = w + br + y(q - k). Why should the price markup over wages rise 
if interest rates increase? The authors offer two explanations. First, in 
their customer-market view, firms raise prices in response to a rise in r* 
because they become less interested in using low prices today to build a 
large clientele in the future, because the future is now more heavily 
discounted. A second reason that r might enter the price equation is if 
the firm's production technology implies a lag between inputs and 
outputs. Suppose, for example, that the labor input at time t produces 
output at t + 1, with the Cobb-Douglas technology Q,+I = L,a KR -a. A 
competitive firm will choose L, to maximize Qt+ I/(1 + r) - (W,/P,) L,, 
which results in a price equationp, = wt + r + [(1 - ot)/ot] (q,+ I - k).3 
The implications of r in the price equation should be clear. Since 
dq = (PI)dr* - (114)dp, any factor that tends to push up domestic prices 
will tend to reduce dq and perhaps even result in dq < 0. 
A useful way to think about all of these various effects is that the rise 
in r* reduces demand while the induced rise in e raises demand by 
improving the country's competitiveness. Factors that tend to raise p in 
response to the rise of r* and e (such as wage indexation, links of prices 
to competitors' prices, or interest rate effects) all work to reduce or 
eliminate Europe's gain in competitiveness and make it more likely that 
the direct negative effect on r* will dominate. To see how all of the 
various effects work together, substitute the following equations for 
equations lb and Id: 
(2) (a) c = w + br + y(q - k) (marginal cost) 
(b) p = ~c + y (1 - ;)(p* + e) (customer market pricing) 
(c) w = Opc (wage indexation) 
(d) Pc = Ap + (1 - A)(e + p*) (consumer price index) 
Solving equations la, c, and e, with equations 2a-d, we get the general 
expression: 
(3) dq = -l\- [-i44(l-0) + +4, + u(l-;) + ;0(1l-X)], 
where 
A= [,40(l-O) + iJy + (1-;) + 0(1l-X)] > O. 
3. Simply equate Q,,+ I/IL, to (1 + r)(W,/P,); solve for L,; and replace the optimal L, in 
the production function to find Q+, = c. K [(1 + r) (W,IP,)] - -I'" -, where co is a constant. 
Taking logarithms, approximating log (1 + r) by r, and ignoring log co, we get the stated 
equation. 
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Note the following points: high wage indexation (0 - 1) is a sufficient 
condition for negative transmission; price "followership" (40) is a 
sufficient condition for negative transmission; and a high value of 8 
results in negative transmission. 
The interest rate effect in the price equation helps to reconcile the 
rise in European unemployment with the high but declining measured 
wage gaps observed for several European countries. Remember that the 
wage gap seeks to compare the percentage deviation of actual real 
wages from the full-employment equilibrium wage. If L is full employ- 
ment, and Q,+ = L,a K' -a, the full-employment wage is given by 
(WIP,tY = ox (KIL)1 -/(I + r). However, if as is conventional, (W,IP,t is 
calculated on the basis of Q, = L,taKl-, without a production lag, 
(W,/P,y will be measured as ot(KIL)I - . Thus, when r rises, the conven- 
tional measure of the wage gap will overstate (W,IP,t, since it will not 
recognize that the higher r has reduced the true full-employment wage, 
and it will thereby understate the true wage gap. 
While the authors focus their attention on the direct effects of the 
U. S. policy mix, there is little reason to doubt many additional influences 
on European unemployment, including the contractionary European 
policies in the wake of the high inflation of the late 1970s and the second 
OPEC price shock of 1979-80 (remember, for example, that the U.K. 
depression took hold well before the Reagan policy mix even started); 
the contractionary European policies in response to the rise inpc induced 
by the dollar appreciation; and the continuing low levels of investment 
in Europe (until quite recently) in light of the continuing European profit 
squeeze. 
The authors focus most of their attention on the cyclical aspects of 
the U.S. policy mix, but they do mention the longer-term effects of high 
r* on k, the European capital stock. In the models I have discussed, a 
fall in k surely produces a fall in q. The rise in r* thereby has a longer- 
term depressing effect on European output via k, and this effect is made 
more severe by European real wage rigidity. Indeed, for a strictly fixed 
WIP (and assuming no productivity growth), a rise in r* can lead to an 
unchecked decline in k, since the quasi rents per unit of capital will 
remain consistently below the now-higher cost of capital. It should be 
noted that in several European economies (Germany being the preemi- 
nent example), the persistently low investment rates in recent years 
mean that the economies are near to full capacity as judged by factory 
utilization rates, despite record high levels of unemployment. 
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Both for the cyclical reasons discussed earlier and the longer-term 
effects on k, the U.S. policy mix will tend to be most devastating for 
economies with labor market institutions that reduce the responsiveness 
of real wages to external shocks and to internal unemployment. While a 
comparative analysis of the recent OECD unemployment experience in 
light of the authors' arguments must await a later day, it does seem 
apparent hat flexible real wage countries, such as Japan and corporatist 
Norway and Sweden, were able to turn the U.S. policy mix into export- 
led growth (as in the "orthodox" model), by virtue of the fact that real 
wages fell enough to make room for higher r*. In the less flexible cases, 
such as France and the United Kingdom, the authors' "unorthodox" 
conclusions are most apparent. 
General Discussion 
Several participants addressed the question of the continued existence 
of a real wage gap in Europe. Robert Gordon agreed with Fitoussi and 
Phelps that real wage rigidity cannot explain continued high European 
unemployment. He noted that there has been substantial real wage 
moderation in Europe since 1979; indeed, wage gap indexes for European 
manufacturing are now substantially lower than those for U.S. manufac- 
turing. Gordon also pointed out a flaw in wage gap estimates based on 
the widely used OECD data, in which self-employment income is treated 
as profits. Although shifts out of self-employment in both Europe and 
Japan have increased the share of employee compensation in GNP, the 
share of employee compensation and self-employment income together 
has not changed much. Charles Schultze reported that EEC data, which 
apportion self-employment income between labor and capital, show 
only a small rise in labor's share for the economy as a whole in most 
European countries and for Europe as a whole. The same data do show 
widespread increases in labor's share within manufacturing, implying 
labor's share outside of manufacturing is declining. Jeffrey Sachs com- 
mented that changes in labor's share bear no one-for-one relationship 
with changes in the wage gap. Indeed, if the aggregate production 
function is Cobb-Douglas, increases in real wages will produce only a 
temporary increase in labor's share; the increase will disappear as 
employers shed workers whose marginal productivity falls short of the 
new higher wage. Much of the recent decline in labor's share, Sachs 
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continued, reflects the growth in unemployment. More careful estimates 
of the wage gap based on production function analysis show that it is 
still positive and significant in most of the large European countries. 
Those estimates do show, however, that the current wage gap is limited 
to manufacturing. Why wages have fallen less in manufacturing than in 
services has not been adequately studied. 
Schultze noted that, regardless of what the relative price data pre- 
sented by the authors show, European capital goods production has not 
suffered disproportionately in recent years. Between 1980 and 1985 the 
production of investment goods fared no worse than total industrial 
production in France and Italy and did much better in Germany. Among 
the four large European countries, only in the United Kingdom did the 
relative production of investment goods decline. 
Peter Kenen commented that, given the pressure on European mark- 
ups when the dollar was weak in the late 1970s, it is hardly surprising 
that those markups have risen in the past few years. More recently, the 
rise of the yen against the dollar appears to have squeezed Japanese 
manufacturers' margins; dollar prices of Japanese products have not 
risen nearly as much the yen has appreciated. In Kenen's view, the 
authors' framework was more elaborate than necessary for explaining 
the common-sense short-run response of markups to exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
Richard Cooper was disturbed by the basic thrust of the paper, which 
he saw as laying Europe's economic problems at America's feet. U.S. 
policy affected Europe both through interest rates and through exchange 
rates. The Europeans could have offset any negative real effects on their 
economies by adopting more expansionary monetary or fiscal policies, 
but chose not to. Cooper cited two considerations that inhibited German 
policymakers. First, preoccupation with the size of the public debt, 
which was, in fact, small by the standards of many other countries, ruled 
out expansionary fiscal policy. Second, concern with the inflation that 
might accompany too rapid a depreciation of the currency led policy- 
makers to resist more expansionary monetary policy. Kenen suggested 
that another drag on German fiscal expansion has been the government's 
desire to reduce the size of the public sector and its fear that any increases 
in government expenditure would not be temporary. 
